Research Interest
Game Theory, Microeconomic Theory, Contract Theory
“Starting Small to Communicate,” (with A. Atakan and E. Kubilay), Games and Economic Behavior, (2020), 121, 265-296.
“Strategic Feedback in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence,” (with S. Ertac and M. Gumren), Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, (2019), 162, 1-23.
“The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence.” (with S. Ertac and D. Ozdemir), Games and Economic Behavior (2016), 100, 24-45.
“Commitment without Reputation: Renegotiation-Proof Contracts under Asymmetric Information,” (with E. Gerratana), Review of Economic Design (2015), 19, 173-209.
“Litigation and Settlement under Judicial Agency,” (with M. Usman), International Review of Law and Economics (2012), 32, 300-308.
“Strategic Effects of Incomplete and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts,” (with E. Gerratana),
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances) (2012), 12:1.
“Bargaining and Exclusivity in a Borrower-Lender Relationship,” (with S. Özerturk), Review of Economic Design (2007), 11, 53-68.
“Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments,” Economic Theory (2007), 31, 539-552.
“Strategic Delegation by Unobservable Incentive Contracts,” (with E. A. Ok), Review of Economic Studies (2004), 71, 397-424.
“The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences,” (with E. A. Ok andR. Sethi), Journal of Economic Theory (2000), 92, 274-299.
“Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games,” (with E. A. Ok and R. Sethi), Games and Economic Behavior (2000), 31, 303-310.
“Negatively Interdependent Preferences,” (with E. A. Ok), Social Choice and Welfare (2000), 17, 533-558.
“Popular Support for Progressive Taxation in the Presence of Interdependent Preferences,” (with T. Mitra and E. A. Ok), Economics Letters (1998), 58, 69-76.