Research Interest
Game Theory, Information Economics, Auctions, Mechanism Design, Evolutionary Game Theory
Dr. Yilankaya served as an Assistant and then as Associate Professor of Economics (with tenure) at the Department of Economics, The University of British Columbia between 1999 and 2010, and at Koç University between 2010 and 2016. He holds a PhD in Economics from Northwestern University (1999) and a BA in Economics from Boğaziçi University (1994).
Dr. Yilankaya’s research has focused on auctions, mechanism design, and evolutionary game theory. He has published in journals such as The Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior and Economic Theory.
Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs, with Xiaoyong Cao, Guofu Tan, Guoqiang Tian. Economic Theory, 2018, 65(2): 231-249.
Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation, with Gorkem Celik. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2017, 54: 148-174.
Optimal auctions with simultaneous and costly participation, with Gorkem Celik. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2009, 9(1).
Evolution of preferences, with Eddie Dekel, Jeffrey C. Ely. Review of Economic Studies, 2007, 74(3): 685-704.
Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs, with Guofu Tan. Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 59(2): 383-396.
Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs, with Guofu Tan. Journal of Economic Theory, 2006, 130(1): 205-219.
A model of evidence production and optimal standard of proof and penalty in criminal trials. Canadian Journal of Economics, 2002, 35(2): 385-409.
Cooperation, secret handshakes, and imitation in the prisoners’ dilemma, with Thomas Wiseman. Games and Economic Behavior, 2001, 37(1): 216-242.
Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences, with Jeffrey C. Ely. Journal of Economic Theory, 2001, 97(2): 255-272.
A note on the seller’s optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information, Journal of Economic Theory, 1999, 87(1): 267-271.